

BY AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS.

THE
Public Statutes at Large
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

FROM THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN 1789, TO MARCH 3, 1845.

ARRANGED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.

WITH
REFERENCES TO THE MATTER OF EACH ACT AND TO THE SUBSEQUENT ACTS
ON THE SAME SUBJECT,

AND
COPIOUS NOTES OF THE DECISIONS

OF THE
Courts of the United States

CONSTRUING THOSE ACTS, AND UPON THE SUBJECTS OF THE LAWS.

WITH AN
INDEX TO THE CONTENTS OF EACH VOLUME,
AND A
FULL GENERAL INDEX TO THE WHOLE WORK, IN THE CONCLUDING VOLUME.

TOGETHER WITH
*The Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and
the Constitution of the United States;*

AND ALSO,
TABLES, IN THE LAST VOLUME, CONTAINING LISTS OF THE ACTS RELATING TO THE JUDICIARY,
IMPOSTS AND TONNAGE, THE PUBLIC LANDS, ETC.

EDITED BY
RICHARD PETERS, ESQ.,
COUNSELLOR AT LAW.

The rights and interest of the United States in the stereotype plates from which this work is printed, are hereby recognised, acknowledged, and declared by the publishers, according to the provisions of the joint resolution of Congress, passed March 3, 1845.

VOL. I.

BOSTON:
CHARLES C. LITTLE AND JAMES BROWN.

1848.

CHAP. XX.—*An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States.*(a)

SECTION 1. *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the supreme court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and five associate justices,(b) any four of whom shall be a quorum, and shall hold annually at the seat of government two sessions, the one commencing the first Monday of February, and the other the first Monday of August. That the associate justices shall have precedence according to the date of their commissions, or when the commissions of two or more of them bear date on the same day, according to their respective ages.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That the United States shall be, and they hereby are divided into thirteen districts, to be limited and called as follows, to wit: one to consist of that part of the State of Massachusetts which lies easterly of the State of New Hampshire, and to be called Maine District; one to consist of the State of New Hampshire, and to be called New Hampshire District;(c) one to consist of the remaining part of the State of Massachusetts, and to be called Massachusetts district; one to consist of the State of Connecticut, and to be called Connecticut District; one to consist of the State of New York, and to be called New York District; one to consist of the State of New Jersey, and to be called New Jersey District; one to consist of the State of Pennsylvania, and to be called Pennsylvania District; one to consist of the State of Delaware, and to be called Delaware District; one to consist of the State of Maryland, and to be called Maryland District; one to consist of the State of Virginia, except that part called the District of Kentucky, and to be called Virginia District; one to consist of the remaining part of the State of Virginia, and to be called Kentucky District; one to consist of the State of South Carolina, and to be called South Carolina District; and one to consist of the State of Georgia, and to be called Georgia District.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted,* That there be a court called a District Court, in each of the afore mentioned districts, to consist of one judge, who shall reside in the district for which he is appointed, and shall be called a District Judge, and shall hold annually four

STATUTE I.
Sept. 24, 1789.

Supreme court to consist of a chief justice, and five associates.

Two sessions annually.
Precedence.

Thirteen districts.

Maine.
N. Hampshire.
Massachusetts.

Connecticut.
New York.
New Jersey.
Pennsylvania.
Delaware.
Maryland.

Virginia.
Kentucky.

South Carolina.
Georgia.

A district court in each district.

(a) The 3d article of the Constitution of the United States enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only where the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his right in a form presented by law. It then becomes a case. *Osborn et al. v. The Bank of the United States*, 9 Wheat. 738; 5 Cond. Rep. 741.

(b) By the act of April 29, 1802, chap. 31, the Supreme Court was declared to consist of a Chief Justice and six associate Justices, and by the act of March 3, 1837, chap. 34, it was made to consist of a Chief Justice and eight associate Justices.

By the act of April 29, 1802, chap. 31, the provision of the act of September 24, 1789, requiring two annual sessions of the Supreme Court, was repealed, and the 2d section of that act required that the associate Justice of the fourth circuit should attend at Washington on the first Monday of August annually, to make all necessary rules and orders, touching suits and actions depending in the court. This section was repealed by the 7th section of the act of February 25, 1839, chap. 36.

By an act passed May 4, 1826, chap. 37, the sessions of the Supreme Court were directed to commence on the second Monday in January annually, instead of the first Monday in February; and by an act passed June 17, 1844, the sessions of the Supreme Court were directed to commence on the first Monday in December annually.

(c) The jurisdiction and powers of the District Courts have been declared and established by the following acts of Congress: Act of September 24, 1789; act of June 5, 1794, sec. 6; act of May 10, 1800; act of December 31, 1814; act of April 16, 1816; act of April 20, 1818; act of May 15, 1820; act of March 3, 1793.

The decisions of the Courts of the United States on the jurisdiction of the District Courts have been: *The Thomas Jefferson*, 10 Wheat. 428; 6 Cond. Rep. 173. *M'Donough v. Danery*, 3 Dall. 188; 1 Cond. Rep. 94. *United States v. La Vengeance*, 3 Dall. 297; 1 Cond. Rep. 132. *Glass et al. v. The Betsey*, 3 Dall. 6; 1 Cond. Rep. 10. *The Alerta v. Blas Moran*, 9 Cranch, 359; 3 Cond. Rep. 425. *The Merino et al.*, 9 Wheat. 391; 5 Cond. Rep. 623. *The Josefa Segunda*, 10 Wheat. 312; 6 Cond. Rep. 111. *The Bolina*, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 75. *The Robert Fulton*, Paine's C. C. R. 620. *Jansen v. The Vrow Christiana Magdalena*, Bee's D. C. R. 11. *Jennings v. Carson*, 4 Cranch, 2; 2 Cond. Rep. 2. *The Sarah*, 8 Wheat. 391; 5 Cond. Rep. 472. *Penhallow et al. v. Doane's Adm'rs*, 3 Dall. 54; 1 Cond. Rep. 2. *The United States v. Richard Peters*, 3 Dall. 121; 1 Cond. Rep. 60. *M'Lellan v. the United States*,

Four sessions annually in a district; and when held.

Special district courts.

Stated district courts; when holden.

Special courts, where held.

Where records kept.

Three circuits, and how divided.

[Obsolete.]

sessions, the first of which to commence as follows, to wit: in the districts of New York and of New Jersey on the first, in the district of Pennsylvania on the second, in the district of Connecticut on the third, and in the district of Delaware on the fourth, Tuesdays of November next; in the districts of Massachusetts, of Maine, and of Maryland, on the first, in the district of Georgia on the second, and in the districts of New Hampshire, of Virginia, and of Kentucky, on the third Tuesdays of December next; and the other three sessions progressively in the respective districts on the like Tuesdays of every third calendar month afterwards, and in the district of South Carolina, on the third Monday in March and September, the first Monday in July, and the second Monday in December of each and every year, commencing in December next; and that the District Judge shall have power to hold special courts at his discretion. That the stated District Court shall be held at the places following, to wit: in the district of Maine, at Portland and Pownalsborough alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of New Hampshire, at Exeter and Portsmouth alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Massachusetts, at Boston and Salem alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Connecticut, alternately at Hartford and New Haven, beginning at the first; in the district of New York, at New York; in the district of New Jersey, alternately at New Brunswick and Burlington, beginning at the first; in the district of Pennsylvania, at Philadelphia and York Town alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Delaware, alternately at Newcastle and Dover, beginning at the first; in the district of Maryland, alternately at Baltimore and Easton, beginning at the first; in the district of Virginia, alternately at Richmond and Williamsburgh, beginning at the first; in the district of Kentucky, at Harrodsburgh; in the district of South Carolina, at Charleston; and in the district of Georgia, alternately at Savannah and Augusta, beginning at the first; and that the special courts shall be held at the same place in each district as the stated courts, or in districts that have two, at either of them, in the discretion of the judge, or at such other place in the district, as the nature of the business and his discretion shall direct. And that in the districts that have but one place for holding the District Court, the records thereof shall be kept at that place; and in districts that have two, at that place in each district which the judge shall appoint.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That the before mentioned districts, except those of Maine and Kentucky, shall be divided into three circuits, and be called the eastern, the middle, and the southern circuit. That the eastern circuit shall consist of the districts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York; that the middle circuit shall consist of the districts of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia; and that the southern circuit shall consist of the districts of South Carolina and Georgia, and that there shall be held annually in each district of said circuits, two courts, which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any two justices of

1 Gallis. C. C. R. 227. Hudson et al. v. Questier, 6 Cranch, 281; 2 Cond. Rep. 374. Brown v. The United States, 8 Cranch, 110; 3 Cond. Rep. 56. De Lovio v. Boit et al., 2 Gallis. Rep. 398. Burke v. Trevitt, 1 Mason, 96. The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546; 4 Cond. Rep. 322. The Abby, 1 Mason, 360. The Little Ann, Paine's C. C. R. 40. Slocum v. Mayberry et al., 2 Wheat. 1; 4 Cond. Rep. 1. Southwick v. The Postmaster General, 2 Peters, 442. Davis v. A New Brig, Gilpin's D. C. R. 473. Smith v. The Pekin, Gilpin's D. C. R. 203. Peters' Digest, "Courts," "District Courts of the United States."

The 2d section of the act of Congress of 1789, to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, which provides that no summary writ, return of process, judgment, or other proceedings in the courts of the United States shall be abated, arrested or quashed for any defect or want of form, &c., although it does not include verdicts, eo nomine, but judgments are included, and the language of the provision, "writ, declaration, judgment or other proceeding, in court causes," and further "such writ, declaration, pleading, process, judgment or other proceeding whatsoever," is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace every conceivable step to be taken in a court, from the emanation of the writ, down to the judgment. Roach v. Hulings, 16 Peters, 319.

the Supreme Court, and the district judge of such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum: *Provided*, That no district judge shall give a vote in any case of appeal or error from his own decision; but may assign the reasons of such his decision.

SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That the first session of the said circuit court in the several districts shall commence at the times following, to wit: in New Jersey on the second, in New York on the fourth, in Pennsylvania on the eleventh, in Connecticut on the twenty-second, and in Delaware on the twenty-seventh, days of April next; in Massachusetts on the third, in Maryland on the seventh, in South Carolina on the twelfth, in New Hampshire on the twentieth, in Virginia on the twenty-second, and in Georgia on the twenty-eighth, days of May next, and the subsequent sessions in the respective districts on the like days of every sixth calendar month afterwards, except in South Carolina, where the session of the said court shall commence on the first, and in Georgia where it shall commence on the seventeenth day of October, and except when any of those days shall happen on a Sunday, and then the session shall commence on the next day following. And the sessions of the said circuit court shall be held in the district of New Hampshire, at Portsmouth and Exeter alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Massachusetts, at Boston; in the district of Connecticut, alternately at Hartford and New Haven, beginning at the last; in the district of New York, alternately at New York and Albany, beginning at the first; in the district of New Jersey, at Trenton; in the district of Pennsylvania, alternately at Philadelphia and Yorktown, beginning at the first; in the district of Delaware, alternately at New Castle and Dover, beginning at the first; in the district of Maryland, alternately at Annapolis and Easton, beginning at the first; in the district of Virginia, alternately at Charlottesville and Williamsburgh, beginning at the first; in the district of South Carolina, alternately at Columbia and Charleston, beginning at the first; and in the district of Georgia, alternately at Savannah and Augusta, beginning at the first. And the circuit courts shall have power to hold special sessions for the trial of criminal causes at any other time at their discretion, or at the discretion of the Supreme Court. (a)

First session
of the circuit
courts; when
holden.
[Obsolete.]

Where holden.

Circuit courts.
Special ses-
sions.

(a) The sessions of the Circuit Courts have been regulated by the following acts: In ALABAMA—act of March 3, 1837. In ARKANSAS—act of March 3, 1837. In CONNECTICUT—act of September 24, 1789; act of April 13, 1792; act of March 2, 1793; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of May 13, 1826. In DELAWARE—act of September 24, 1789; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 24, 1804; act of March 3, 1837. In GEORGIA—act of September 24, 1789; act of August 11, 1790; act of April 13, 1792; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of May 13, 1826; act of Jan. 21, 1829. KENTUCKY—act of March 3, 1801; act of March 8, 1802; act of March 2, 1803; act of Feb. 27, 1807; act of March 22, 1808; April 22, 1824. LOUISIANA—act of March 3, 1837. MAINE—act of March 3, 1801; act of March 8, 1802; act of March 30, 1820. MARYLAND—act of Sept. 24, 1789; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of Feb. 11, 1830; act of March 3, 1837. MASSACHUSETTS—act of Sept. 24, 1789; act of March 3, 1791; act of June 9, 1794; act of March 2, 1793; act of March 3, 1797; act of March 3, 1801; act of March 8, 1802; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 26, 1812. MISSOURI—act of March 3, 1837. MISSISSIPPI—act of March 3, 1839. NEW HAMPSHIRE—act of Sept. 24, 1789; act of March 3, 1791; act of April 13, 1792; act of March 2, 1793; act of March 3, 1797; act of March 3, 1801; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 6, 1812. NEW JERSEY—act of September 24, 1789; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 2, 1802. NEW YORK—act of September 24, 1789; act of March 3, 1791; act of April 13, 1792; act of March 2, 1793; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 3, 1825; act of February 10, 1832; act of May 13, 1836; act of March 3, 1837. NORTH CAROLINA—act of September 24, 1789; act of April 13, 1792; act of March 2, 1793; act of March 31, 1796; act of March 3, 1797; act of July 5, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 8, 1806; act of February 4, 1807. OHIO—act of February 24, 1807; act of March 22, 1808; act of April 22, 1824; act of May 20, 1826. PENNSYLVANIA—act of September 24, 1789; act of May 12, 1796; act of March 3, 1797; act of December 24, 1799; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 3, 1837. RHODE ISLAND—act of June 23, 1790; act of March 3, 1791; act of March 2, 1793; act of May 22, 1796; act of March 3, 1797; act of March 3, 1801; act of March 8, 1802; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 22, 1812. SOUTH CAROLINA—act of September 24, 1789; act of August 11, 1790; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of April 14, 1816; act of May 25, 1824; act of March 3, 1825; act of May 4, 1826; act of February 5, 1829. TENNESSEE—act of February 24, 1807; act of March 22, 1808; act of March 10, 1812; act of January 13, 1831. VERMONT—act of March 2, 1791; act of March 2, 1793; act of May 27, 1796; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 22, 1816. VIRGINIA—act of September 24, 1789; act of March 3, 1791; act of April 13, 1792; act of March 3, 1797; act of April 29, 1802; act of March 2, 1837. See the General Index.

Supreme court
adjourned by
one or more
justices; circuit
courts adjourn-
ed.

District courts
adjourned.

The courts
have power to
appoint clerks.

Their oath or
affirmation.

Oath of jus-
tices of supreme
court and judges
of the district
court.

District courts
exclusive juris-
diction.

SEC. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That the Supreme Court may, by any one or more of its justices being present, be adjourned from day to day until a quorum be convened; and that a circuit court may also be adjourned from day to day by any one of its judges, or if none are present, by the marshal of the district until a quorum be convened: (a) and that a district court, in case of the inability of the judge to attend at the commencement of a session, may by virtue of a written order from the said judge, directed to the marshal of the district, be adjourned by the said marshal to such day, antecedent to the next stated session of the said court, as in the said order shall be appointed; and in case of the death of the said judge, and his vacancy not being supplied, all process, pleadings and proceedings of what nature soever, pending before the said court, shall be continued of course until the next stated session after the appointment and acceptance of the office by his successor.

SEC. 7. *And be it [further] enacted*, That the Supreme Court, and the district courts shall have power to appoint clerks for their respective courts, (b) and that the clerk for each district court shall be clerk also of the circuit court in such district, and each of the said clerks shall, before he enters upon the execution of his office, take the following oath or affirmation, to wit: "I, A. B., being appointed clerk of _____, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I will truly and faithfully enter and record all the orders, decrees, judgments and proceedings of the said court, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties of my said office, according to the best of my abilities and understanding. So help me God." Which words, so help me God, shall be omitted in all cases where an affirmation is admitted instead of an oath. And the said clerks shall also severally give bond, with sufficient sureties, (to be approved of by the Supreme and district courts respectively) to the United States, in the sum of two thousand dollars, faithfully to discharge the duties of his office, and seasonably to record the decrees, judgments and determinations of the court of which he is clerk.

SEC. 8. *And be it further enacted*, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit: "I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me as _____, according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God."

SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted*, That the district courts (c) shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the

By the act of March 10, 1838, the Justice of the Supreme Court is required to attend but one circuit in the districts of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan.

By an act passed in 1844, the Justices of the Supreme Court are empowered to hold but one session of the Circuit Court in each district in their several circuits. The Judges of the District Courts hold the other sessions of the Circuit Court in their several districts.

(a) The provisions of law on the subject of the adjournments of the Supreme Court in addition to the 6th section of this act, are, that in case of epidemical disease, the court may be adjourned to some other place than the seat of government. Act of February 25, 1799.

(b) By the 2d section of the act entitled "an act in amendment of the acts respecting the judicial system of the United States," passed February 28, 1839, chap. 36, it is provided "that all the circuit courts of the United States shall have the appointment of their own clerks, and in case of disagreement between the judges, the appointment shall be made by the presiding judge of the court." See *ex parte Duncan* N. Hennen, 13 Peters, 230.

(c) The further legislation on the subject of the jurisdiction and powers of the District Courts are: the act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, sec. 6; act of May 10, 1800, chap. 51, sec. 5; act of February 24, 1807, chap. 13; act of February 24, 1807, chap. 16; act of March 3, 1815; act of April 16, 1816, chap. 56, sec. 6; act of April 20, 1818, chap. 88; act of May 15, 1820, chap. 106, sec. 4; act of March 3, 1823, chap. 72.

high seas; where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas; (a) saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States. (b) And shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. (c) And shall also have cognizance, concurrent as last mentioned, of all suits at common law where the United States sue, and the matter in dispute amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars. And shall also have jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for offences above the description aforesaid. (d) And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.

SEC. 10. *And be it further enacted*, That the district court in Kentucky district shall, besides the jurisdiction aforesaid, have jurisdiction of all other causes, except of appeals and writs of error, hereinafter made cognizable in a circuit court, and shall proceed therein in the same

[Acts of June 5, 1794, sect. 6; act of Feb. 13, 1807; act of March 3, 1815, sect. 4.]

Original cognizance in maritime causes and of seizure under the laws of the United States.

Concurrent jurisdiction.

Trial of fact by jury.

Kentucky district court.
[Obsolete.]
1807, ch. 16.

(a) Jurisdiction of the District Courts in cases of admiralty seizures, under laws of impost, navigation and trade. *M'Donough v. Danery*, 3 Dall. 188; 1 Cond. Rep. 94. *The United States v. La Vengeance*, 3 Dall. 297; 1 Cond. Rep. 132. *Glass et al. v. The Betsey*, 3 Dall. 6; 1 Cond. Rep. 10. *The Alerta*, 9 Cranch, 359; 3 Cond. Rep. 425. *The Merino et al.*, 9 Wheat. 391; 5 Cond. Rep. 623. *The Josefa Segunda*, 10 Wheat. 312; 6 Cond. Rep. 111. *Jennings v. Carson*, 4 Cranch, 2; 2 Cond. Rep. 2. *The Sarah*, 8 Wheat. 391; 5 Cond. Rep. 472. *Penhallow et al. v. Doane's Adm'rs*, 3 Dall. 54; 1 Cond. Rep. 21. *United States v. Richard Peters*, 3 Dall. 121; 1 Cond. Rep. 60. *Hudson et al. v. Guesner*, 6 Cranch, 281; 2 Cond. Rep. 374. *Brown v. The United States*, 8 Cranch, 110; 3 Cond. Rep. 56. *The Sarah*, 8 Wheat. 391; 5 Cond. Rep. 472. *The Amiable Nancy*, 3 Wheat. 546; 4 Cond. Rep. 322. *Slocum v. Mayberry*, 2 Wheat. 1; 4 Cond. Rep. 1. *Gelston et al. v. Hoyt*, 3 Wheat. 246; 4 Cond. Rep. 244. *The Bolina*, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 75. *The Robert Fulton*, 1 Paine's C. C. R. 620; Bee's D. C. R. 11. *De Lovio v. Boit et al.*, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 398. *The Abby*, 1 Mason's Rep. 360. *The Little Ann*, Paine's C. C. R. 40. *Davis v. A New Brig*, Gilpin's D. C. R. 473. *The Catharine*, 1 Adm. Decis. 104.

(b) An information against a vessel under the act of Congress of May 22, 1794, on account of an alleged exportation of arms, is a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and an appeal from the District to the Circuit Court, in such a case is sustainable. It is also a civil cause, and triable without the intervention of a jury, under the 9th section of the judicial act. *The United States v. La Vengeance*, 3 Dall. 297; 1 Cond. Rep. 132. *The Sarah*, 8 Wheat. 391; 5 Cond. Rep. 472. *The Abby*, 1 Mason, 360. *The Little Ann*, Paine's C. C. R. 40.

When the District and State courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the right to maintain the jurisdiction attaches to that tribunal which first exercises it, and obtains possession of the thing. *The Robert Fulton*, Paine's C. C. R. 620.

(c) *Burke v. Trevitt*, 1 Mason, 96. The courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction of all seizures made on land or water, for a breach of the laws of the United States, and any intervention of State authority, which by taking the thing seized out of the hands of the officer of the United States, might obstruct the exercise of this jurisdiction, is unlawful. *Slocum v. Mayberry et al.*, 2 Wheat. 1; 4 Cond. Rep. 1.

(d) *Davis v. Packard*, 6 Peters, 41. As an abstract question, it is difficult to understand on what ground a State court can claim jurisdiction of civil suits against foreign consuls. By the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; and the judiciary act of 1789 gives to the district courts of the United States, exclusively of the courts of the several States, jurisdiction of all suits against consuls and vice consuls, except for certain offences enumerated in this act. *Davis v. Packard*, 7 Peters, 276.

If a consul, being sued in a State court, omits to plead his privilege of exemption from the suit, and afterwards, on removing the judgment of the inferior court to a higher court by writ of error, claims the privilege, such an omission is not a waiver of the privilege. If this was to be viewed merely as a personal privilege, there might be grounds for such a conclusion. But it cannot be so considered; it is the privilege of the country or government which the consul represents. This is the light in which foreign ministers are considered by the law of nations; and our constitution and law seem to put consuls on the same footing in this respect. *Ibid.*

Maine district court.
[*Obsolete.*]

Circuit courts original cognizance where the matter in dispute exceeds five hundred dollars.

manner as a circuit court, and writs of error and appeals shall lie from decisions therein to the Supreme Court in the same causes, as from a circuit court to the Supreme Court, and under the same regulations. (a) And the district court in Maine district shall, besides the jurisdiction herein before granted, have jurisdiction of all causes, except of appeals and writs of error herein after made cognizable in a circuit court, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court: And writs of error shall lie from decisions therein to the circuit court in the district of Massachusetts in the same manner as from other district courts to their respective circuit courts.

SEC. 11. *And be it further enacted,* That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State. (b) And shall have

(a) By an act passed February 24, 1807, the Circuit Court jurisdiction of the District Court of Kentucky was abolished.

(b) The amount laid in the declaration is the sum in controversy. If the plaintiff receive less than the amount so claimed, the jurisdiction of the court is not affected. *Green v. Litter*, 8 Cranch, 229. *Gordon v. Longest*, 16 Peters, 97. *Lessee of Hartshorn v. Wright, Peters' C. C. R.* 64.

By the 5th section of the act of February 21, 1794, "an act to promote the progress of the useful arts," &c., jurisdiction in actions for violations of patent rights, is given to the Circuit Courts. Also by the act of February 15, 1819, original cognizance, as well in equity as at law, is given to the Circuit Courts of all actions, and for the violation of copy rights. In such cases appeals lie to the Supreme Court of the United States. So also in cases of interest, or disability of a district judge. Act of May 8, 1792, sec. 11; act of March 2, 1809, sec. 1; act of March 3, 1821.

Jurisdiction in cases of injunctions on Treasury warrants of distress. Act of May 15, 1820, sec. 4. Jurisdiction in cases removed from State courts. Act of February 4, 1815, sec. 8; act of March 3, 1815, sec. 6.

Jurisdiction in cases of assigned debentures. Act of March 2, 1799.

Jurisdiction of crimes committed within the Indian territories. Act of March 30, 1830, sec. 15; act of April 30, 1816, sec. 4; act of March 3, 1817, sec. 2.

Jurisdiction in bankruptcy. Act of August 19, 1841, chap. 9, [repealed.]

Jurisdiction in cases where citizens of the same State claim title to land under a grant from a State other than that in which the suit is pending in a State court. Act of September 24, 1789, sec. 12. See *Colson v. Lewis*, 2 Wheat. 377; 4 Cond. Rep. 168.

Jurisdiction where officers of customs are parties. Act of February 4, 1815, sec. 8; act of March 3, 1815, sec. 6; act of March 3, 1817, sec. 2.

A circuit court though an inferior court in the language of the constitution, is not so in the language of the common law; nor are its proceedings subject to the scrutiny of those narrow rules, which the caution or jealousy of the courts at Westminster long applied to courts of that denomination; but are entitled to as liberal intendments and presumptions in favour of their regularity, as those of any supreme court. *Turner v. The Bank of North America*, 4 Dall. 8; 1 Cond. Rep. 205.

The Circuit Courts of the United States have cognizance of all offences against the United States. What those offences are depends upon the common law applied to the sovereignty and authorities confided to the United States. *The United States v. Coolidge*, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 488, 495.

Where the jurisdiction of the federal courts has once attached, no subsequent change in the relation or condition of the parties in the progress of the cause, will oust that jurisdiction. *The United States v. Meyers*, 2 Brocken. C. C. R. 516.

All the cases arising under the laws of the United States are not, per se, among the cases comprised within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, under the provisions of the 11th section of the judiciary act of 1789. *The Postmaster General v. Stockton and Stokes*, 12 Peters, 524.

Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States in suits between aliens and citizens of another State than that in which the suit is brought:

The courts of the United States will entertain jurisdiction of a cause where all the parties are aliens, if none of them object to it. *Mason et al. v. The Blaireau*, 2 Cranch, 240; 1 Cond. Rep. 397.

The Supreme Court understands the expressions in the act of Congress, giving jurisdiction to the courts of the United States "where an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State," to mean that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom have a right to sue, or may be sued in the federal courts: that is, when the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue or be liable to be sued in those courts. *Strawbridge v. Curtis*, 3 Cranch, 267; 1 Cond. Rep. 523.

Neither the Constitution nor the act of Congress regards the subject of the suit, but the parties to it. *Mossman's Exors v. Higginson*, 4 Dall. 12; 1 Cond. Rep. 210.

When the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court depends on the character of the parties, and such party consists of a number of individuals, each one must be competent to sue in the courts of the United States, or jurisdiction cannot be entertained. *Ward v. Arrendo et al.*, *Paine's C. C. R.* 410. *Strawbridge v. Curtis*, 3 Cranch, 267; 1 Cond. Rep. 523.

The courts of the United States have not jurisdiction, unless it appears by the record that it belongs

exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, (a) except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the United States shall otherwise direct, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein. But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action before a circuit or district court. (b) And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ, nor shall any district or circuit court have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange. (c) And the circuit courts shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the district courts under the regulations and restrictions herein after provided. (d)

SEC. 12. *And be it further enacted,* That if a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court; and the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such state court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit court, to be held in the district where the suit is pending, or if in the district of Maine to the district court next to be holden therein, or if in Kentucky district to the district court next to be holden therein, and offer good and sufficient surety for his entering in such court, on the first day of its session, copies of said process against him, and also for his there appearing and entering special bail in the cause, if special bail was originally requisite therein, it shall then be the duty of the state court to accept the surety, and proceed no further in the cause, and any bail that may have been originally taken shall be discharged, and the said copies being entered as aforesaid, in such court of the United States, the cause shall there proceed in the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process. (c) And any attach-

Exclusive cognizance of crimes and offences cognizable under the laws of the United States.

No person to be arrested in one district for trial in another on any civil suit.

Limitation as to civil suits. Actions on promissory notes.

Circuit courts shall also have appellate jurisdiction.

Matter in dispute above 500 dollars.

Removal of causes from state courts.

Special bail.

to them, as that the parties are citizens of different States. *Wood v. Wagon*, 2 Cranch, 9; 1 Cond. Rep. 335.

Where the parties to a suit are such as to give the federal courts jurisdiction, it is immaterial that they are administrators or executors, and that those they represent were citizens of the same State. *Chapdelaine et al. v. Decheneaux*, 4 Cranch, 306; 2 Cond. Rep. 116. *Childress et al. v. Emory et al.*, 8 Wheat. 642; 5 Cond. Rep. 547. See also *Brown v. Strode*, 5 Cranch, 303; 2 Cond. Rep. 265. *Bingham v. Cabot*, 3 Dall. 382; 1 Cond. Rep. 170. *Gracie v. Palmer*, 8 Wheat. 699; 5 Cond. Rep. 561. *Massie v. Watts*, 6 Cranch, 148; 2 Cond. Rep. 332. *Sere et al. v. Pitot et al.*, 6 Cranch, 332; 2 Cond. Rep. 389. *Shute v. Davis*, Peters' C. C. R. 431. *Flanders v. The Aetna Ins. Com.*, 3 Mason, C. C. R. 158. *Kitchen v. Sullivan et al.*, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 84. *Briggs v. French*, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 252.

(a) The Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a robbery committed on the high seas under the 8th section of the act of April 30, 1790, although such robbery could not, if committed on land, be punished with death. *The United States v. Palmer et al.*, 3 Wheat. 610; 4 Cond. Rep. 352. See *The United States v. Coolidge et al.*, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 488, 495. *The United States v. Coombs*, 12 Peters, 72.

The Circuit Courts have no original jurisdiction in suits for penalties and forfeitures arising under the laws of the United States, but the District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction. *Ketland v. The Cassius*, 2 Dall. 365.

(b) The petitioner was arrested in Pennsylvania, by the marshal of the district of Pennsylvania, under an attachment from the Circuit Court of Rhode Island, for a contempt in not appearing in that court after a monition, served upon him in the State of Pennsylvania, to answer in a prize cause as to a certain bale of goods condemned to the captors, which had come into the possession of Peter Graham, the petitioner. Held, that the circuit and district courts of the United States cannot, either in suits at law or equity, send their process into another district, except where specially authorized so to do by some act of Congress. *Ex parte Peter Graham*, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 456.

(c) *Bean v. Smith*, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 252. *Young v. Bryan*, 6 Wheat. 146; 5 Cond. Rep. 44. *Molan v. Torrance*, 9 Wheat. 537; 5 Cond. Rep. 666.

(d) *Smith v. Jackson*, Paine's C. C. R. 453.

(e) The Judge of a State Court to which an application is made for the removal of a cause into a court of the United States must exercise a legal discretion as to the right claimed to remove the cause;

Attachment of goods holden to final judgment.

Title of land where value exceeds 500 dollars.

If in Maine and Kentucky, where causes are removable. [Obsolete.]

Issues in fact by jury.

Supreme court exclusive jurisdiction.

Proceedings against public ministers.

ment of the goods or estate of the defendant by the original process, shall hold the goods or estate so attached, to answer the final judgment in the same manner as by the laws of such state they would have been holden to answer final judgment, had it been rendered by the court in which the suit commenced. And if in any action commenced in a state court, the title of land be concerned, and the parties are citizens of the same state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, the sum or value being made to appear to the satisfaction of the court, either party, before the trial, shall state to the court and make affidavit if they require it, that he claims and shall rely upon a right or title to the land, under a grant from a state other than that in which the suit is pending, and produce the original grant or an exemplification of it, except where the loss of public records shall put it out of his power, and shall move that the adverse party inform the court, whether he claims a right or title to the land under a grant from the state in which the suit is pending; the said adverse [party] shall give such information, or otherwise not be allowed to plead such grant, or give it in evidence upon the trial, and if he informs that he does claim under such grant, the party claiming under the grant first mentioned may then, on motion, remove the cause for trial to the next circuit court to be holden in such district, or if in the district of Maine, to the court next to be holden therein; or if in Kentucky district, to the district court next to be holden therein; but if he is the defendant, shall do it under the same regulations as in the before-mentioned case of the removal of a cause into such court by an alien; and neither party removing the cause, shall be allowed to plead or give evidence of any other title than that by him stated as aforesaid, as the ground of his claim; and the trial of issues in fact in the circuit courts shall, in all suits, except those of equity, and of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, be by jury.(a.)

SEC. 13. *And be it further enacted,* That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.(b.) And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul,

the defendant being entitled to the right to remove the cause under the law of the United States, on the facts of the case, (the judge of the State court could not legally prevent the removal); the application for the removal having been made in proper form, it was the duty of the State court to proceed no further in the cause. *Gordon v. Longest*, 16 Peters, 97.

One great object in the establishment of the courts of the United States, and regulating their jurisdiction, was to have a tribunal in each State presumed to be free from local influence, and to which all who were non-residents or aliens, might resort for legal redress; and this object would be defeated if a judge in the exercise of any other than a legal discretion, may deny to the party entitled to it, a removal of his cause. *Ibid.*

(a) The provisions of the laws of the United States relating to juries, and trials by jury are:—*Trial by jury*—act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20, sec. 10, sec. 12, sec. 15.—*Exemption from attending on juries*—act of May 7, 1800, chap. 46, sec. 4. *Choice of jurors and qualification of juries*—act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20, sec. 29; act of May 13, 1800; act of July 20, 1840; act of March 3, 1841, chap. 19. Expired as to juries in Pennsylvania. Special jury act of April 29, 1802, chap. 31, sec. 30.—*Jury in criminal cases*—act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20, sec. 29; act of April 30, 1790, chap. 9. *Manner of summoning jurors*—act of September 24, 1789, sec. 29; act of April 29, 1802, chap. 31. *Jurymen de talibus*—act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20.

(b) As to cases in which States, or alleged States, are parties, the following cases are referred to: *The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia*, 5 Peters, 1. *New Jersey v. The State of New York*, 5 Peters, 284. *Ex parte Juan Madrazo*, 7 Peters, 627. *The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts*, 12 Peters, 657. *Cohens v. The State of Virginia*, 6 Wheat, 264; 5 Cond. Rep. 90. *New York v. Connecticut*, 4 Dall. 3. *Fowler v. Lindsay et al.*, 3 Dall. 411.

or vice consul, shall be a party. (a) And the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; (b) and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition (c) to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of *mandamus*, (d) in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.

Sup. Court
appellate juris-
diction.

Writs of Pro-
hibition.

Of Mandamus.

Sec. 14. And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of *scire facias*, *habeas corpus*, (e) and all other writs not specially provided for

Courts may
issue writs scire
facias, habeas
corpus, &c.

(a) The United States v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; 6 Cond. Rep. 394. Davis v. Packard, 6 Peters, 41.
(b) As to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see the cases collected in Peters's Digest, "Supreme Court," "Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court," and the following cases: The United States v. Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 103; 2 Cond. Rep. 434. *Wiscart v. Dauchy*, 3 Dall. 321; 1 Cond. Rep. 144. *United States v. Moore*, 3 Cranch, 159; 1 Cond. Rep. 480. *Owings v. Norwood's Lessee*, 5 Cranch, 344; 2 Cond. Rep. 275. *Martin v. Hunter's Lessee*, 1 Wheat. 304; 3 Cond. Rep. 575. *Gordon v. Caldcleugh*, 3 Cranch, 269; 1 Cond. Rep. 524. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; 5 Cond. Rep. 225. *Smith v. The State of Maryland*, 6 Cranch, 286; 2 Cond. Rep. 377. *Inglee v. Coolidge*, 2 Wheat. 363; 4 Cond. Rep. 155. *Nicholls et al. v. Hodges Ex'ors*, 1 Peters, 562. *Buel et al. v. Van Ness*, 8 Wheat. 312; 5 Cond. Rep. 445. *Miller v. Nicholls*, 4 Wheat. 311; 4 Cond. Rep. 465. *Matthews v. Zane et al.*, 7 Wheat. 164; 5 Cond. Rep. 265. *McCluny v. Silliman*, 6 Wheat. 598; 5 Cond. Rep. 197. *Houston v. Moore*, 3 Wheat. 433; 3 Cond. Rep. 286. *Montgomery v. Hernandez et al.*, 12 Wheat. 129; 6 Cond. Rep. 475. *Cohens v. Virginia*, 6 Wheat. 264; 5 Cond. Rep. 90. *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 6 Wheat. 448; 5 Cond. Rep. 134. *Weston et al. v. The City Council of Charleston*, 2 Peters, 448. *Hickie v. Starke et al.*, 1 Peters, 94. *Satterlee v. Matthewson*, 2 Peters, 330. *McBride v. Hoey*, 11 Peters, 167. *Ross v. Barland et al.*, 1 Peters, 655. *The City of New Orleans v. De Armas*, 9 Peters, 224. *Crowell v. Randall*, 10 Peters, 368. *Williams v. Norris*, 12 Wheat. 117; 6 Cond. Rep. 462. *Menard v. Aspasia*, 5 Peters, 505. *Worcester v. The State of Georgia*, 6 Peters, 515. *The United States v. Moore*, 3 Cranch, 159; 1 Cond. Rep. 430.

(c) Prohibition. Where the District Court of the United States has no jurisdiction of a cause brought before it, a prohibition will be issued from the Supreme Court to prevent proceedings. *The United States v. Judge Peters*, 3 Dall. 121; 1 Cond. Rep. 60.

(d) Mandamus. The following cases have been decided on the power of the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus. *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch, 137; 1 Cond. Rep. 267. *McCluny v. Silliman*, 2 Wheat. 369; 4 Cond. Rep. 162. *United States v. Lawrence*, 3 Dall. 42; 1 Cond. Rep. 19. *United States v. Peters*, 3 Dall. 121; 1 Cond. Rep. 60. Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529; 5 Cond. Rep. 660. *Parker v. The Judges of the Circuit Court of Maryland*, 12 Wheat. 561; 6 Cond. Rep. 644. Ex parte Roberts et al., 6 Peters, 216. Ex parte Davenport, 6 Peters, 661. Ex parte Bradstreet, 12 Peters, 174; 7 Peters, 634; 8 Peters, 583. *Life and Fire Ins. Comp. of New York v. Wilson's heirs*, 8 Peters, 291.

On a mandamus a superior court will never direct in what manner the discretion of the inferior tribunal shall be exercised; but they will, in a proper case, require an inferior court to decide. *Ibid.* *Life and Fire Ins. Comp. of New York v. Adams*, 9 Peters, 571. Ex parte Story, 12 Peters, 339. Ex parte Jesse Hoyt, collector, &c., 13 Peters, 279.

A writ of mandamus is not a proper process to correct an erroneous judgment or decree rendered in an inferior court. This is a matter which is properly examinable on a writ of error, or an appeal to a proper appellate tribunal. *Ibid.*

Writs of mandamus from the Circuit Courts of the United States. A Circuit Court of the United States has power to issue a mandamus to a collector, commanding him to grant a clearance. *Gilchrist et al. v. Collector of Charleston*, 1 Hall's Admiralty Law Journal, 439.

The power of the Circuit Court to issue the writ of mandamus is confined exclusively to those cases in which it may be necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction. *McIntire v. Wood*, 7 Cranch, 504; 2 Cond. Rep. 588.

The Circuit Courts of the United States have no power to issue writs of mandamus after the practice of the King's Bench; but only where they are necessary for the exercise of their jurisdiction. *Smith v. Jackson*, Paine's C. C. R. 453.

(e) Habeas corpus. Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; 1 Cond. Rep. 594; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; 2 Cond. Rep. 33.

The writ of habeas corpus does not lie to bring up a person confined in the prison bounds upon a *capias ad satisfaciendum*, issued in a civil suit. Ex parte Wilson, 6 Cranch, 52; 2 Cond. Rep. 300. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; 5 Cond. Rep. 225.

The power of the Supreme Court to award writs of habeas corpus is conferred expressly on the court by the 14th section of the judicial act, and has been repeatedly exercised. No doubt exists respecting the power. No law of the United States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be issued, nor the power of the court over the party brought up by it. The term used in the constitution is one which is well understood, and the judicial act authorizes the court, and all other courts of the United States and the judges thereof to issue the writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment." Ex parte Tobias Watkins, 3 Peters, 201.

As the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is appellate, it must be shown to the court that the court has power to award a habeas corpus, before one will be granted. Ex parte Milburn, 9 Peters, 704.

Act of 1793, ch. 22; act of 1807, ch. 13; act of 1818, ch. 83; act of Feb. 1819; act of May 20, 1826, ch. 124.

Limitation of writs of habeas corpus.

Parties shall produce books and writings.

Suits in equity limited.

by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of *habeas corpus* for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.—*Provided*, That writs of *habeas corpus* shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same; or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.

Sec. 15. *And be it further enacted*, That all the said courts of the United States, shall have power in the trial of actions at law, on motion and due notice thereof being given, to require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery; and if a plaintiff shall fail to comply with such order, to produce books or writings, it shall be lawful for the courts respectively, on motion, to give the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit; and if a defendant shall fail to comply with such order, to produce books or writings, it shall be lawful for the courts respectively on motion as aforesaid, to give judgment against him or her by default. (a)

Sec. 16. *And be it further enacted*, That suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law. (b)

The act of Congress authorizing the writ of habeas corpus to be issued "for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment," applies as well to cases of commitment under civil as those of criminal process. See Chief Justice Marshall, 2 Brocken. C. C. R. 447. Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 232. United States v. French, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 2. Holmes v. Jennison, Governour of the State of Vermont, 14 Peters, 540.

(a) It is sufficient for one party to suggest that the other is in possession of a paper, which he has, under the act of Congress, given him notice to produce at the trial, without offering other proof of the fact; and the party so called upon must discharge himself of the consequences of not producing it, by affidavit or other proof that he has it not in his power to produce it. Hylton v. Brown, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 298.

The court will not, upon a notice of the defendant to the plaintiff to produce a title paper to the land in dispute, which is merely to defeat the plaintiff's title, compel him to do so; unless the defendant first shows title to the land. Merely showing a right of possession is not sufficient to entitle him to the aid of a court of chancery, or of the Supreme Court, to compel a discovery of papers which are merely to defeat the plaintiff's title without strengthening the defendant's. It is sufficient, in order to entitle him to call for papers to show the title to the land, although none is shown in the papers. *Ibid*.

Where one party in a cause wishes the production of papers supposed to be in the possession of the other, he must give notice to produce them: if not produced, he may give inferior evidence of their contents. But if it is his intention to nonsuit the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff requiring the papers means to obtain a judgment by default, under the 15th section of the judicial act, he is bound to give the opposite party notice that he means to move the court for an order upon him to produce the papers, or on a failure so to do, to award a nonsuit or judgment, as the case may be. Bas v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 381.

No advantage can be taken of the non-production of papers, unless ground is laid for presuming that the papers were, at the time notice was given, in the possession or power of the party to whom notice was given, and that they were pertinent to the issue. In either of the cases, the party to whom notice was given may be required to prove, by his own oath, that the papers are not in his possession or power; which oath may be met by contrary proof according to the rules of equity. *Ibid*.

To entitle the defendant to nonsuit the plaintiff for not obtaining papers which he was noticed to produce, the defendant must first obtain an order of the court, under a rule that they should be produced. But this order need not be absolute when moved for, but may be nisi, unless cause be shown at the trial. Dunham v. Riley, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 126.

Notice to the opposite party to produce on the trial all letters in his possession, relating to monies received by him under the award of the commissioners under the Florida treaty, is sufficiently specific as they described their subject matter. If to such notice the party answer on oath that he has not a particular letter in his possession, and after diligent search could find none such, it is sufficient to prevent the offering of secondary proof of its contents. The party cannot be asked, or compelled to answer whether he ever had such a letter in his possession. Vasse v. Mifflin, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 519.

(b) The equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is independent of the local law of any State, and is the same in nature and extent as the equity jurisdiction of England from which it is derived. Therefore it is no objection to this jurisdiction, that there is a remedy under the local law. Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 401.

If a case is cognizable at common law, the defendant has a right of trial by jury, and a suit upon it cannot be sustained in equity. Baker v. Biddle, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 405.